Издание содержит: познание в контексте культуры; эпистемология социально-гуманитарного знания; история философии: опыт познания культуры и др.

BackgroundPreprint usage is growing rapidly in the life sciences; however, questions remain on the relative quality of preprints when compared to published articles. An objective dimension of quality that is readily measurable is completeness of reporting, as transparency can improve the reader’s ability to independently interpret data and reproduce findings.MethodsIn this observational study, we initially compared independent samples of articles published in bioRxiv and in PubMed-indexed journals in 2016 using a quality of reporting questionnaire. After that, we performed paired comparisons (...) between preprints from bioRxiv to their own peer-reviewed versions in journals.ResultsPeer-reviewed articles had, on average, higher quality of reporting than preprints, although the difference was small, with absolute differences of 5.0% [95% CI 1.4, 8.6] and 4.7% [95% CI 2.4, 7.0] of reported items in the independent samples and paired sample comparison, respectively. There were larger differences favoring peer-reviewed articles in subjective ratings of how clearly titles and abstracts presented the main findings and how easy it was to locate relevant reporting information. Changes in reporting from preprints to peer-reviewed versions did not correlate with the impact factor of the publication venue or with the time lag from bioRxiv to journal publication.ConclusionsOur results suggest that, on average, publication in a peer-reviewed journal is associated with improvement in quality of reporting. They also show that quality of reporting in preprints in the life sciences is within a similar range as that of peer-reviewed articles, albeit slightly lower on average, supporting the idea that preprints should be considered valid scientific contributions. (shrink)

Psychologist Richard Nisbett argues that fundamental aspects of critical thinking and logic are culturally conditioned. Nisbett’s claims, if correct, have substantial implications for the teaching of logic and critical thinking. In this paper I examine Nisbett’s arguments and conclude that he overstates the degree to which his empirical work justifies his theories about cultural difference. I will argue that we have good reason to be cautious about revising our pedagogy on the basis of assumptions about cultural difference, and that Nisbett’s (...) work does not provide convincing enough evidence to justify setting that caution aside. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article focuses on Part III of Tarrant's paper, ‘Utilitarianism, education and the philosophy of moral insignificance’. His argument that Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures appeals to non-utilitarian values is rejected on the grounds that he misconstrues Mill's concept of‘content’ and fails to give an adequate critique of Mills attempt to distinguish between the quantity and quality of pleasures. An improved criticism is offered, and it is argued that utilitarianism fails through the dependence of happiness itself upon (...) non-utilitarian values. It is concluded that utilitarianism would devalue the role of liberal arts subjects in sensitising pupils to the problematic nature of human happiness. (shrink)

The following emendations are a selection from adversaria made during repeated readings of Athenaeus. The material to hand during the several perusals has consisted chiefly of Kaibel's recension , the variorum edition of Schweighhauser, and Meineke's Comic Fragments. The editor of the Classical Quarterly has been kind enough to check my suggestions by reference to other material, and I have to thank him for the excision of sundry emendations for which I cannot claim priority. As the full discussion of the (...) several passages here touched upon would require considerable space, I have contented myself with a brevity which is not intended to be in any way dogmatic; but which aims simply at economy of paper and type. I hope at an early date to enter more fully and systematically into the emendation and interpretation of this interesting and instructive writer. (shrink)

This work is, in large part, a series of refutations; it is also the author's Ph.D. thesis. First to be refuted is Russell's vicious circle principle as a general remedy for the solution of the paradoxes. The author rejects the classification of paradoxes into syntactic and semantic, since in his view there are no purely syntactic paradoxes. The distinction in logic between the uninterpreted syntactical aspect of a system and the system when given a determinate interpretation is held to be (...) untenable. Tarski's distinction between object-language and meta-language and his concept of semantically closed language are considered irrelevant for the solution of the Liar paradox. The author claims that the usual versions of the Liar paradox have the same structure as the Barber paradox, viz., [S ↔ ~S]. The author solves the Liar paradox by pointing out that it does not have a proper reference. Cantor's diagonal argument for the indenumerability [[sic]] of the real numbers is labeled as unsatisfactory. Since the diagonal number is dependent upon the real numbers in the constructed list, the author claims that this makes the diagonal number to be of a different nature and status than the real numbers in the list; thus we have what the author calls the dependence fallacy. The author also refuses to accept Cantor's nested interval proof of the indenumerability [[sic]] of the real numbers. Within the proof, two infinite sequences are constructed, each of which converges to a limit. Because the proof does not give a "definite rule of convergence," the author is not satisfied that the infinite sequences converge. Also rejected is Cantor's theorem. Other paradoxes analyzed are the Berry, Richard, heterological, "Richardian", Russell, Cantor, and Burali-Forti paradoxes.--T. G. N. (shrink)

A pedantic and tedious discussion of Socrates’ arguments in Plato’s Crito for obeying the law. Its author, A. D. Woozley, who was a contributor to The Philosophy of Socrates, edited by Gregory Vlastos, focuses on the logical adequacy of Socrates’ arguments. Predictably, he finds them wanting.

Several difficulties that accompany Plato's theory of Forms have received considerable attention in the philosophical literature in the past half century. A great deal of discussion and controversy surrounds the dialogue Parmenides and the group of considerations commonly called the “Third Man Argument”. Our purpose here is to strike out in one direction suggested by this passage, but it can in no way be thought of as an exegesis nor a logical elucidation of the “Third Man Argument” itself. While what (...) we shall say here has an obvious affinity and connection with the Parmenides passage, the two principal questions that concern us here are of a more general nature than the specific points in the Parmenides. The first is whether Plato's theory of Forms involves a regress which is ruinous to the theory. The second is, if a self-destructive regress is a necessary consequence of the theory, what elements of Plato's theory make the regress inescapable. (shrink)

This paper argues that professionals who make boundary-related decisions should be guided by relationship-based practice. In our roles as service users and professionals, drawing from our lived experiences of professional relationships, we argue we need to move away from distance-based practice. This includes understanding the boundary stories and narratives that exist for all of us – including the people we support, other professionals, as well as the organisations and systems within which we work. When we are dealing with professional boundary (...) issues, we should centre relationship-building skills that are central to many other aspects of our work. Skills that foster relationships at all levels – between professionals, service users, and services – need to be revalued. Our final recommendation is to create, develop, and foster safer spaces within and outside of organisations, as well as inter-professionally, for the discussion and exploration of boundary-related issues and practice. We are interested in hearing from those with experiences of being marginalised by boundaries so that they can inform a reshaping of our collective ideas around boundary related practices. To foster relationship-based practices in organisations, we have outlined several recommendations here; however, we recognize that these do not go far enough, and that collective action is needed to inform systemic change. (shrink)

Improving Your Reasoning is an expanded version of Chapter 10 of the author's larger work, Principles of Logic. The first chapter of Improving Your Reasoning is a general survey of arguments--deductive and inductive, valid and invalid, syllogistic and nonsyllogistic--and serves as an introduction for the rest of the book which deals only with fallacies. The types of fallacies are divided by chapter into the following principal categories: begging the question, pseudoauthority, irrelevant appeals, confusion, faulty classification, political fallacies, and inductive fallacies. (...) Each of these categories is further divided into a comprehensive range of sub-categories, with each sub-category presented in a short and easily understandable section. For example, inductive fallacies are divided into hasty generalization, accident, false cause, gambler's, faulty analogy, central tendency, misleading percentages, and misleading totals. Problems and answers are provided. This book may be used as a supplementary text for introductory logic.--T. G. N. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Making Sense and Meaning: On the Role of Communication and Culture in the Reproduction of Social Systems” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: The author addresses implications arising from socializing observer-dependent heuristics. Above all, Palmaru’s terminology is called into question since its conceptual deficiencies with regard to the relation between an observing system and its environments cause naturalistic fallacy. The author’s reply espouses a concise reanalysis of the complementary relations of fundamentally incomparable domains, namely the observer (...) and the social system. (shrink)

If the title of this book is surprising from a professor of sociology, its contents are even stranger. Yet this is a very good book. Blum follows neither the historical approach of classical philology—which usually presents a report on Socrates’ philosophical teachings and a judgment on his contribution to later developments—nor the example of careful exegesis of Platonic and Xenophontic texts engaged in by Leo Strauss and others. Instead, he conducts what he calls a "conversation" with Socrates, who exemplifies the (...) belonging-together of "Theory and Life". Theory needs life because life and its end, the good, enable theory to distinguish the essential and necessary from the inessential and contingent; life needs theory because it cannot achieve its end without "discoursing, questing, and inquiring." What matters in taking Socrates seriously is not a correct "biography or obituary" of the man but "friendliness" toward him, demonstrated in the work of discourse with him. Chapters 2 and 3 examine two opinions hostile to Socrates. "Hedonism" denies life’s need for theory by claiming that freedom, not the good, is what life is; consequently, speech is not an uncovering of truth but is only a convention establishing general agreement. "Exegesis," on the other hand, denies theory’s need of life, for it tries to reproduce the point of view of others as would a merely neutral observer who has nothing to learn and nothing to talk seriously about. Blum’s central theme, to which he returns again and again, and on which he plays many variations, is this: speech points toward a wholeness other than itself and other than life; this wholeness can at most be imaged or alluded to in speech; man’s place in the kosmos is in speech, in between that wholeness and the mere contingency of brutishness. Socrates’ concern with "Justice" and "Work" embody that theme. A chapter on "Philosophy" warns against the danger of merely seeking that which is common in the multiplicity of things: commonness is not essence. Finally, in the closest thing to textual exegesis in the book, Blum treats "The Oracle" as a metaphor for the Good to which speech aspires and co-responds. (shrink)